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WHY DON’T WE ALL JUST WEAR ROBES?
RUTHANN ROBSON1
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and law professors select our professional outfits each day,
often experiencing a mix of consternation and gratification. The dread
springs from our failures: to know what constitutes the “right look;” to
be able to achieve that “right look;” to anticipate what the day will bring;
to have prepared by doing the laundry or other tasks. The joy resides in
self-expression; we fashion ourselves as works of art, even within the
constraints of professional attire.
It could have been different. We could have sacrificed the satisfaction
of self-expression for the complacency of conformity; we could wear
robes. Judges—at least when they are on the bench—are relieved from
the obligation of selecting their attire as they are denied their individuality. But the history and current controversies of robes, for judges and
others, is not so simple. Professional dress in classrooms and courtrooms shares the common ancestry of academic and legal robes, both of
which are related to the dress of religious clerics. By the Tudor era, various regulations attended to the specific requirements of various ceremonial robes, while more generally graduate students and barristers
were essentially equated with gentlemen and allowed to dress accordingly.2 Fashions changed: black replaced more colorful garments during
the mourning for monarchs; wigs substituted for hoods as head coverings.3 Yet the main purposes are hierarchal: a person’s individuality is
subsumed by a costume that symbolized respect for the profession and
the dignity of it.
1 * Professor of Law & University Distinguished Professor, City University of New York School
of Law. This article is adapted from RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY,
SEXUALITY, AND DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES (Cambridge U. Press 2013).
2 Noel Cox, Tudor Sumptuary Laws and Academical Dress: An Act against Wearing of Costly Apparel 1509 and an Act for Reformation of Excess in Apparel 1533, 6 TRANSACTIONS BURGAN SOC’Y 15,
15-43 (2006).
3 An English Judge’s Dress, 3 CANADIAN L. REV. 321-332 (1904).
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It can sometimes seem to be a tempting solution to alleviate the discriminations, angst, and even cost of dressing professionally—especially for those whose appearance is gendered female or nonbinary—to
argue for the adoption of robes in the legal and teaching professions.
But, even if this were possible, it is not a tenable solution. Section I of
this Article considers the cult of the judicial robe, examining judicial
views on the metonymy of judges and their attire, as well as First
Amendment and ethical issues regarding when and how judges can
wear their robes. Part II shifts to lawyers in the courtroom, especially—
but not only—women attorneys, and analyzes cases challenging judges
who imposed dress codes on attorneys. Part III considers the possibility
of dress in the courtroom as “disruptive” to “decorum” with an emphasis
on our clients and others who appear in the courtroom but who can too
often be forgotten. This section begins by discussing the historical precedent of William Penn, then the Chicago Eight trial, and then more recent controversies regarding the courtroom attire and expressions of
spectators. Part IV returns to the issue of professional dress for teachers, who like attorneys once wore robes, and then interrogates the mandate of the graduation robe. The robe, like any other article of attire, can
be deployed in an oppressive manner as well as a liberatory one.
I. THE CULT OF THE ROBE
While there is no specific dress mandate for federal judges, some
states have rules of court that require a judge in open court to wear a
judicial robe, or more specifically a “suitable black judicial robe,” or even
more specifically a black robe that “must extend in front and back from
the collar and shoulders to below the knees” with “sleeves to the
wrists.”4
The early American controversies regarding how similar the dress of
Article III judges would be to their British counterparts implicated style
and nation-building, but also the symbolism of democracy and constitutionalism. The eventual compromise abandoned the British fashion for
4 See Pennsylvania Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of Magisterial District Judges (judicial robes); Michigan Court Rules, Rule 8.115 (black robe); Alaska Rules of Administration, Rule 21
(a suitable black judicial robe); California Rules of Court, Rule 10.505 (the judicial robe must be
black, extend in front and back from the collar and shoulders to below the knees, have sleeves to
the wrists). While most state court judges wear black robes, the judges of Maryland’s highest court,
the Court of Appeals, wear scarlet robes with white collars. See Rudolf Lamy, A Study of Scarlet: Red
Robes and the Maryland Court of Appeals (2006), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/lawlib/aboutus/history/judgesrobes.pdf.

ROBSON MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

WHY DON’T WE ALL JUST WEAR ROBES?

3/7/21 4:06 PM

181

various types of court wigs, but adopted British gowns that gradually
eschewed scarlet and silk evolving to the stereotypical robe of black polyester.5
Even as customs settled, however, disagreements over judicial attire
remained. Writing in 1945 while he was a respected Second Circuit
Judge, the legal realist Jerome Frank argued to jettison the robe entirely.6 Frank’s essay, “The Cult of the Robe,” contended that the “pretense that judicial reactions are uniform manifests itself in the demand
that judges wear uniforms.”7 Moreover, Frank argued that the “judge’s
vestments are historically connected with the desire to thwart democracy by means of the courts.”8 He criticized the “atavistic robe” as analogous to an “esoteric judicial vocabulary” that conflicted with the “fundamental democratic principle” disfavoring secrecy.”9 In calling for
abandonment of robe-ism, Frank invoked the ordinary citizen who
would be unused to court-house ways and disquieted by the “strange
garb of the judge.”10
Frank’s view has not prevailed, perhaps in part because the robe has
become the metonym for the judge in contemporary popular culture as
many a political cartoon illustrates. An argument in favor of this metonymic relationship is that robes not only obscure individualism, but that
they foster the judicial independence so important to democratic constitutionalism. In this way, the judicial uniform in the United States—
one that does not generally communicate rank—conveys an institutional message that each judge “belongs to the judiciary.”11
This metonymic relationship, however, can raise constitutional issues. In general, the concern articulated in ethics opinions from various
state committees is the misleading potential of a judicially-garbed candidate, but the effect is to maintain a hierarchy of judges. For example,
in Nevada, the committee on judicial ethics and campaign practices has
5 See John deP Wright, Wigs, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 395 (2006); S. James Clarkson, The Judicial Robe,
1980 SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 143-149 (1980); Charles M. Yablon, Judicial
Drag: As Essay on Wigs, Robes, and Legal Change, WIS. L. REV. 1129-1153 (1995); Rob McQueen, Of
Wigs and Gowns: A Short History of Legal and Judicial Dress in Australia, 16 LAW IN CONTEXT 31, 3158 (1998).
6 See Jerome Frank, The Cult of the Robe, 28 SATURDAY REV. LITERATURE 41 (1945), reprinted in
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 254 (Princeton University
Press, 1949).
7 FRANK, supra note 6, at 254.
8 Id. at 255.
9 Id. at 258.
10 Id. at 257.
11 James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L. REV. 795, 814-816
(1995).

ROBSON MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

182

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

3/7/21 4:06 PM

[Vol. 34:2

opined that a person who has served as an “alternate municipal judge”
or as an “unpaid part-time judge” or as a “full-time judicial master” may
not wear a judicial robe in campaign literature; however, a person who
is a “continuing part-time judge” may wear a judicial robe in campaign
literature.12 Prohibitions on being portrayed wearing robes in judicial
elections may be susceptible to the same sort of First Amendment challenge as a prohibition of announcing views on disputed legal issues in
judicial elections, a prohibition declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.13
While the election context raises the most obvious clash between the
ethical and constitutional considerations of judges donning robes, even
a sitting judge may encounter such a conflict. In Jenevein v. Willing, the
Fifth Circuit partially expunged the censure of a Texas judge by the
state’s commission on judicial ethics “to the extent it reached beyond”
the judge’s “use of the courtroom and his robe to send his message.”14
As part of contentious litigation in 2003 that spawned allegations of
bribes, favors, and sexual misconduct, Judge Jenevein held a press conference in the courtroom—and importantly, wore his judicial robe—to
announce his withdrawal from the case and his institution of grievance
proceedings against the attorney who had made the allegations.15 The
attorney, however, filed a grievance against Judge Jenevein for holding
the press conference, and the state commission issued a censure against
the judge, without addressing the First Amendment defenses the judge
had raised.16 Judge Jenevein thereafter brought an action in federal
court challenging the constitutionality of the censure.17 The Fifth Circuit
held that while the judge was indeed an employee, the First Amendment
doctrine governing government employee speech emphasizing the divide between matters of public and private concern was inapposite.18
Instead, the court applied strict scrutiny.19 Considering whether judicial
12 See Opinion JE02-004, Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices (Nevada
2002); Opinion JE03-004, Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices (Nevada
2003); Opinion JE06-014, Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices (Nevada
2006); Opinion JE08-006, Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices (Nevada
2008).
13 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
14 Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 562 (5th Cir. 2007).
15 Id at 553.
16 Id 555.
17 Id at 556–57.
18 Id. at 561; see, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
19 Jenevein, at 558.
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impartiality was a compelling governmental interest, the court held that
it could not be, and said that the “state’s interest in achieving a courtroom that at least on entry of its robed judge becomes a neutral and disinterested temple” was compelling.20 The state’s compelling interest extended to the “judicial use of the robe, which symbolically sets aside the
judge’s individuality and passions.”21 On the issue of whether the censure was narrowly tailored, the court had more difficulty separating the
content of the judicial statements from their environment. The court
found the judge’s use of the “trappings of judicial office to boost his message,” particularly “stepping out from behind the bench, while wearing
his judicial robe, to address the cameras,” could constitutionally support
a censure.22 In a limited victory for the state judge, however, the court
ruled that the content of the statements could not be constitutionally
censured. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the judge was publicly addressing abuse of process, that the communication was between the
judge and “his constituents,” and it was on a matter of “judicial administration” rather than the merits of a case.23
Judges have become more administrative and less judicial, at least according to Justice Rehnquist in his own “The Cult of the Robe” essay published in 1976.24 While Rehnquist did not even allude to matters of habiliment, he stressed the less attractive aspects of uniformity.25 Perhaps
not coincidentally, after Rehnquist assumed the status of Chief Justice of
the United States, he adorned his robe with gold stripes, reportedly inspired by “a production of Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe, in which the
lord chancellor wore a similar robe.”26 Justice Ginsburg described the
stripes as resembling those “of a master sergeant more than those of a
British Lord,” explaining that even though he was “a man not given to
sartorial splendor,” he said he “did not wish to be upstaged by the
women.”27 Ginsburg added that Justice O’Connor, the first woman Supreme Court Justice, “has several attractive neck pieces, collars from
20
21
22
23

Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. The partial nature of Judge Jenevein’s victory is apparent from the Fifth Circuit’s refusal
to grant the judge attorney’s fees as a prevailing party, stating “the relief Jenevein received from
the partial expungement of the commission’s censure was de minimis.” Jenevein v. Willing, 605 F.3d
268, 272 (5th Cir. 2010).
24 William Rehnquist, The Cult of the Robe, 15 JUDGES J. 74 (1976).
25 Id.
26 Henry J. Reske, Showing His Stripes: Operetta Inspires Chief Justice to Alter his Robe, 81 A.B.A.
J. 35 (1995).
27 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 6, 6-10 (1995).
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British gowns, and a frilly French foulard,” while Ginsburg herself wore
“British and French lace foulards too, and sometimes one of French Canadian design.”28 Yet for practicing attorneys, the solutions are not as
elegant, or simple.
II. COURTROOM ATTIRE
For female attorneys in the United States, the choices of courtroom
attire are more complicated than lace collars. The early American adoption, albeit partial, of British judicial attire did not extend to British customs regarding advocates. Until recently, the “court dress” in Great Britain featuring wigs and robes applied to both jurists and barristers, but
not to solicitors, even when solicitor-advocates appeared in court.29 In
late 2011, the UK Supreme Court, established only a few years earlier,
noted that its justices did not “wear legal dress themselves and have decided not to impose this obligation on advocates appearing before
them.”30 The Supreme Court directed that “provided that all the advocates in any particular case agree, they may communicate to the Registrar their wish to dispense with part or all of court dress,” the Court
would “normally agree” to the advocates’ preference with regard to legal dress.31 Advocates’ preferences, however, might well be to don the
traditional garb that has long symbolized status, as well as its gradations. It is not mere coincidence that barristers who have been appointed to the rank of Queen’s Counsel are called “silks” or that solicitors
have argued that they be entitled to wear wigs.32 Moreover, it might not
be mere coincidence that at the very time the British legal profession is
being diversified, the symbols of its status are being abandoned.
While rationales for maintaining formal court dress include hierarchy, as well as tradition, status quo, and “branding,” another benefit is
perceived gender equality.33 A somewhat curmudgeonly call for the
adoption of robed (if not wigged) attorneys in the United States, pointed
to problems with women’s apparel:
Courtroom decorum is adversely affected as more and more
28 Id.
29 See Press Notice, Revised Guidance on Court Dress at the UK Supreme Court, SUP. CT. U.K. (Nov.

21, 2011), available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/pr_1112.pdf.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Asha Rangappa, God Save the Wig, LEGAL AFFS. 10 (May-June 2002).
33 See Yablon, supra note 5, at 1129–30.
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women appear at bar in a tremendous variety of color and design—pants, dresses, suits, blouses (with and without neckties).
The necessary respect of the courtroom is absent when lawyers
are higgledy-piggledy in attire. This is not to say that the woman
who appears in gaucho pants is intentionally flouting the court’s
decorum, but rather that no discernible tradition or norm has
developed in woman’s dress in the court room. But were they
robed, all lawyers would be dressed equally and have a great
and conscious feeling of what they were about. Lawyers would
immediately be inconspicuous and their causes would be foremost—which is as it should be.”34
In the absence of standardized court dress, the professional attire of
women attorneys in the United States has been subject to gendered and
slovenly interpretations. Just as the wig and robe were once construed
as exclusively male apparel, pants can be construed as exclusively male
and thus inappropriate for women attorneys as courtroom attire.
As late as 1991, the New York City bar ethics committee was asked
whether or not female lawyers could “wear appropriately tailored pant
suits or other pant-based outfits in a court appearance.”35 The committee stated that it had been told “judges in this state have remarked negatively in open court on the attire of women lawyers appearing before
them,” and noted individual judges have “some degree of latitude to regulate the conduct of lawyers in their courtrooms.”36 Nevertheless, the
committee stated that while the rules of dress are generally a matter of
custom, pants could certainly qualify as respectful and dignified.37 And
as late as 1994, federal district courts in Oklahoma specifically provided
by local rule that female attorneys must wear dresses or suits (with
skirts).38 The subject of dress codes, whether explicit or implicit, for
women attorneys was included in the many “gender bias in the courts”
reports that began in the state courts in the 1980s. By the time of the
final report of the federal Ninth Circuit’s task force published in 1994,
the survey of 232 federal judges revealed only a small percentage of
34 Lawrence W. Jordan, Jr., Are Robes for Counsel the Only Dress for Courtroom Success? 26
ADVOCATE 17, 17-18 (1983).
35 NYCLA Eth. Op. 688 (1991), available at 1991 WL 755944 (N.Y. Cty. Law. Assn. Comm. Prof.
Eth.).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See Bethanne Walz McNamara, All Dressed Up with No Place to Go: Gender Bias in Oklahoma
Federal Court Dress Codes, 30 TULSA L. J. 395-420 (1994-1995).
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both male and female judges stating that they imposed a “no pantsuit”
rule, although a similarly small percentage of judges (all male) stated
they preferred not to have female counsel appearing when visibly pregnant.39 Yet while the gender bias taskforces were instituted as a strategy
to address gender inequality in the courts amongst advocates, litigants,
and society, they also demonstrate the inadequacy of legal remedies. As
the New York City ethics committee noted in its pantsuit opinion,
“equality of attire in the courtroom” had a constitutional dimension, but
as such it was beyond the committee’s “jurisdiction.”40
The constitutional issues regarding attorney dress can be difficult to
litigate. For the most part, attorneys “dress for success,” which means
elevating their clients’ interests above their own, especially in a courtroom context in which pleasing the judge (and jury) is important. In the
absence of standardized dress codes, the general advice to women is to
err on the side of conservatism, including skirts.41 Yet there have been
a few cases in which the attorney-judge relationship seemed to have devolved into a contempt proceeding, although, even then the constitutional issues can be obscured. For example, when Patricia DeCarlo, a
legal services attorney in Camden New Jersey, wore slacks (gray wool),
a sweater (gray), and a shirt (green) during a court appearance in January 1975, she was eventually held in contempt by the trial judge.42 She
appealed the contempt order, arguing in part that it constituted “unconstitutional discrimination against female attorneys.”43 The appellate
court did not reach the constitutional issue, essentially holding that as a
matter of law DeCarlo’s dress was suitable.44 The opinion noted that she
was attired at oral argument in the appellate court in the same clothes
she wore when the trial judge held her in contempt—a strategy that essentially invoked the judges’ common sense.45 Moreover, the trial
judge’s objection to DeCarlo’s apparel eventually focused not on her

39 See John C. Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts; The Final Report of
the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 852, 852-854 (1994).
40 See NYCLA Eth. Op., supra note 44.
41 See Maureen Howard, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: One Size Does Not Fit All When It Comes
to Courtroom Attire for Women, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 209, 209-224 (2009-2010) (discussing conservative advice, but also arguing for room for personal choice and comfort); see also Wendy Patrick,
Well Suited to the Courtroom: Women in Legal Advocacy, 21 PRAC. LITIG. 7, 7-10 (2010) (assumes
that the suit is skirted, stating it would be a problem if there was “a run in her nylons”).
42 In re De Carlo, 141 N.J. Super. 42 (1976).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id at 46.
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pants, but on her sweater, or perhaps on her “open-collared blouse.”46
For the appellate court, the lack of “standards or traditions for female
attorneys” worked in DeCarlo’s favor, especially as contrasted to the established tradition of neckties for men.47
Rejecting a gender discrimination challenge to the requirement of a
necktie (and jacket) for male attorneys, the Supreme Court of Alaska
reasoned that court orders requiring “appropriate conservative business dress” applied equally to men and women: “Though women need
not be required to wear a coat and tie, they are required to wear conservative business attire. Such a dress code would not discriminate
since the general standard is the same.”48 The court likewise rejected
the argument of attorney Martin Friedman that the tie requirement impaired his ability to represent his client zealously, by interfering with
his ability to connect with jurors.49 All ties, however, are not equal. An
appellate court in New Mexico upheld a trial judge’s interpretation of a
local rule requiring male attorneys to wear “ties” as excluding a bandanna tied above the collar.50 The attorney, Tom Cherryhomes, had “referred to a book on nineteenth century western wear and a dictionary”
to argue that his neckwear satisfied the tie requirement.51 The judge rejected the relevance of history, ordered Cherryhomes to wear a conventional tie, and then held him in contempt when he did not.52 On appeal,
the court circumvented the attorney’s First Amendment argument, reasoning that the constitutional challenge was subsumed into the finding
of contempt.53 Cherryhomes should have complied with the order and
then challenged its constitutionality. Yet the appellate court implied
that such a challenge would not have been successful when it declared
the trial judge’s interpretation of the local rule as “reasonable.”54
Cherryhomes, Friedman, DeCarlo, and other attorneys who have attempted to raise constitutional challenges to orders of attire issued by
judges have faced the “cult of the robe” that accords authority to the judiciary, even if it may be mistaken. While the constitutional arguments
of Cherryhomes, Friedman, and DeCarlo—at least as contained in the
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 44.
Id. at 46.
Friedman v. District Court, 611 P.2d 77 (Ak. 1980).
Id. at 79.
See State v. Cherryhomes, 840 P.2d 1261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 1262.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1265.
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appellate opinions—lack constitutional sophistication, each by implication argued for a standard that would require disruption of the courtroom proceedings. For example, as the court stated in State v. Cherryhomes:
Cherryhomes contends that the issue before this court is
whether his choice of neckwear disrupted the decorum of the
court. He contends that his dress caused no disruption, that the
judge required him to comply with a unique and personal interpretation of the local rule, and that the judge’s ruling infringed
his First Amendment right of free expression. We disagree with
Cherryhomes’s characterization of the issue.55
In Friedman v. District Court, the Alaska Supreme Court stated, “Friedman contends that the imposition of a dress code violates his rights to
personal liberty and privacy under the Alaska Constitution,” and “an attorney’s style of dress, so long as it is not disruptive of judicial proceedings, is beyond the power of the courts to control.”56 And in In the Matter
of De Carlo, the appellate court does not attribute the disruptive standard to the attorney, but to itself:
Styles change and the promulgation of limits in dress is beyond
precise articulation. Appellant was attired at oral argument in
the clothes she wore in the trial court . . . [i]n our view, they were
not of the kind that could be fairly labeled disruptive, distractive
or depreciative of the solemnity of the judicial process so as to
foreclose her courtroom appearance.57
This standard would require something more egregious than simply a
lack of dignity, respect, and professionalism. For persons who are not
dressing professionally, the ban on dressing disruptively, whether in
courtrooms, schoolrooms, or in public is often at issue.
III. DISRUPTING COURTROOM DECORUM: CONCERN FOR OUR CLIENTS
The history of disruption of courtroom decorum is interwoven with
the history of the nation, of the First Amendment, and with hats. When
the members of the First Congress debated amending the Constitution
to include what is now the First Amendment, Representative John Page
55 Id. at 1263.
56 Friedman v. District Court, 611 P.2d 77, 78 (Alaska 1980).
57 In the Matter of De Carlo,141 N.J. Super. 42, 47 (1976).
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argued that whether a man has a right to wear his hat or not was far
from trivial.58 The clause being discussed did not refer to hats or other
attire but to the freedom of assembly.59 Page was responding to the previous remarks of Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts,
who had argued that the assembly clause was unnecessary: it was encompassed by the speech clause; it was self-evident; it would never be
called into question; and it was derogatory to the dignity of the House of
Representatives to descend into such minutiae.60 In support of all his
arguments, Sedgwick contended the amendment might just as well declare “a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased.”61 It
proved not to be the best analogy, provoking a trenchant response by
Representative John Page: just as “a man has been obliged to pull off his
hat when he appeared before the face of authority,” so too have people
“been prevented from assembling together on their lawful occasions.”62
As historian Irving Brant observed, Page’s reference had tremendous
resonance for the members of the First Congress who would have understood it as alluding to William Penn’s famous trial.63 A decade before
Penn would receive the large land grant in America that would become
the state of Pennsylvania, Penn and his co-defendant William Mead were
prosecuted in England for “tumultuous assembly” and disturbing the
peace.64 They had preached outside a Quaker meeting house that had
recently been closed by Restoration regulations limiting religious dissent from the recently reestablished Church of England.65 Originally a
pamphlet and purported trial transcript, The Peoples Ancient and Just
Liberties Asserted, In the Tryal of William Penn and William Mead at the
Old Bailey, 22 Charles II 1670, written by themselves, became an essential
American document.66 It portrayed Penn and Mead as heroes seeking
their rights as Englishmen under the Magna Carta but stymied by arbitrary officials in the king’s court.67
58 See NEIL H. COGAN, ED., THE COMPLETE BILLS OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 143-145 (Oxford University Press 1997).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 55-56 (1965).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted, In the Tryal of William Penn and William Mead
at the Old Bailey, 22 Charles II 1670, written by themselves, in WILLIAM PENN, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF WILLIAM PENN (ed: Andrew R Murphy) 3-21 (2002).
67 Id. It appears as William Penn & William Mead, The Trial of William Penn and William Mead,
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Their hats were central to this portrait. As Quakers, Penn and Mead
denied so-called hat honor, the male practice of doffing one’s cap to a
superior including removing one’s hat in court.68 The refusal of hat
honor, intended to challenge hierarchy, had become a well-known characteristic of the Quakers; a fair number of Quakers had been beaten,
jailed, whipped, or fined because of their practice by the time of the Penn
and Mead trial.69 Thus, this colloquy was not surprising:
RECORDER. Do you know where you are?
PENN. Yes.
RECORDER. Do you know it is the King’s Court?
PENN. I know it to be a Court, and I suppose it to be the King’s
Court.
RECORDER. Do you not know there is respect due to the Court?
PENN. Yes.
RECORDER. Why do you not pay it then?
PENN. I do so.
RECORDER. Why do you not put off your hat then?
PENN. Because I do not believe that to be any respect.
RECORDER. Well, the Court sets forty marks a piece upon your
heads as a fine for your contempt of the Court.70

at the Old Bailey, for Tumultuous Assembly: 22 Charles II. A.D. 1670, in 6 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 999, 1006–09 (1816). For discussions, see John D.
Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 575-77 (2010); John S. Wilson, The
Importance of a Hat, Paper CXVIII, (Chicago: Chicago Literary Club, 1999/2001), available at:
http://www.chilit.org/PublishedPapers.htm; Andrew Murphy, The Trial Transcript as Political
Theory: Penn-Mead in Anglo-American Political Thought, draft, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1914723.
68 HOWELL, supra note 87, at 999.
69 See Krista J. Kesselring, Gender, the Hat, and Quaker Universalism in the Wake of the English
Revolution, 26.2 THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 299-322 (2011). See also Maryland State Archives, Volume 53, Preface 44, p. xliv “In Kent a rule of court was adopted at the September 1658 sessions,
doubtless as the result of a recent offence, ‘That noe man presume excepte a member of the Court
to Stand wth his hat on his head in the prsence of the Court . . . or use any unscivill Language’ (Arch.
Md. liv, 139). At the next session held in October, Henry Carline, a Quaker, was fined 30 pounds of
tobacco for disobeying this order (Arch. Md. liv, 146).” Available at: http://www.msa.md.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000053/html/am53p—44.html.
70 HOWELL, supra note 87, at 956 .
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However, shortly before this interchange, Penn and Mead had been
waiting, hatless, for their case to be called.71 When an official noticed
their hats were off, he ordered an officer to “put on their hats again.”72
Seemingly, this command was merely for the purpose of immediately
issuing the order to Penn to remove his hat, an order the court would
have known as problematic for the Quaker William Penn. Immediately
after the Recorder’s fine, Penn and Mead both spoke:
PENN. I desire it might be observed, that we came into the court
with our hats off (that is, taken off,) and if they have been put on
since, it was by order from the bench; and therefore not we, but
the Bench should be fined.
MEAD. I have a question to ask the Recorder: am I fined also?
RECORDER. Yes.
MEAD. I desire the Jury and all people to take notice of this injustice of the recorder. Who spake to me to pull off my hat? and yet
hath he put a fine upon my head.73
The court’s actions regarding the hats—provocative, arbitrary, and lacking the essentials of fairness—set the scene for the remaining injustices
of the trial, the eventual jury acquittal, the prosecution of the jurors for
that acquittal, and the imprisonment of Penn and Mead for contempt for
failure to remove their hats.74
Thus, Representative Sedgwick’s comparison of the right to wear or
not wear a hat and the right to assembly as equally trivial rights was not
likely to be accepted by those familiar with the Penn and Mead trial.
Sedgwick’s motion to strike “assembly” from the text of the First
Amendment failed by a large margin.75 But perhaps Sedgwick was correct. Recent constitutional doctrine tends to support the argument that
assembly is mere surplusage and the right is encompassed by freedom

71
72
73
74

Id. at 955.
Id. at 956.
Id.
See id. at 956, 961–69. The Penn and Mead trial is well-known for its aftermath regarding
the right of jury nullification. See Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, for alleged Misconduct
as a Juryman: 22 CHARLES II. A.D. 1670, in HOWELL, supra note 83, at 999, 1006–09; Simon Stern, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell’s Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1815–16 (2002). For a collection of scholarly writing on the concept
of jury nullification, see Teresa L. Conaway, Carol L. Mutz, & Joann M. Ross, Jury Nullification: A
Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 393 (2004).
75 See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 574–76 (2010).
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of speech.76
Nevertheless, Penn’s hat continues to have some constitutional plangency. Its most famous appearance is in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, albeit in a footnote.77 The Court evoked William
Penn’s hat and the Quaker refusal to exhibit deference as an example of
compelled speech.78 Consistent with Penn’s spirit, and reversing recent
precedent, the Court held that “compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on [the local government’s] power
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of
the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”79
Yet wearing a hat in court persists as constitutionally prohibitable.
Remarkably relying on an interpretation of the courtroom as a nonpublic forum, a federal district judge in 2009 concluded that requiring a litigant to remove his hat—a baseball cap—did not violate the litigant’s
asserted First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.80 There was no issue
of viewpoint discrimination, such as prohibiting only Yankees baseball
caps.81 Instead, the generally accepted etiquette of removing hats in a
courtroom “out of respect” for the judicial process was reasonable: the
litigant had no constitutional right to make a “fashion statement” by
wearing clothes he “might have worn to a baseball game” rather than
attire “suitable to the dignity of a courtroom.”82
If a hat can disrupt courtroom dignity, then the prospect of criminal
defendants donning judicial robes must certainly be disruptive. If those
robes are adorned with symbols of oppression—for example, the yellow
star used by the Nazis to badge Jews—the disruption is even more probable. And if the defendants removed the robes to reveal one of them was
wearing the shirt of a police uniform, and if both defendants walked on
the judicial robes they had removed, then there should be little doubt of
disruption. All of this occurred near the end of the Chicago Conspiracy
76 See id. at 566–67.
77 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1943). The footnote also

includes a reference to William Tell. Id. (“The story of William Tell’s sentence to shoot an apple off
his son’s head for refusal to salute a bailiff’s hat is an ancient one.”)
78 See id. at 633.
79 Id. at 642. The Court reversed Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), decided
only three years earlier.
80 Bank v. Katz, 08-CV-1033 (NGG)(RER), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87929, at *5–10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
24, 2009) aff’d, 424 F. App’x 67 (2d Cir. 2011).
81 Id. at *7.
82 Id. at *6, *9. The original dress dispute occurred in state court with Todd Bank, an attorney
appearing as a pro se litigant, wearing jeans as well as the baseball cap. Id.
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Trial.83
The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, sometimes known as the Chicago Eight
or Chicago Seven Trial, shared many features with the equally notorious
Penn and Mead trial three centuries earlier. The Chicago Conspiracy
Trial also arose from actions involving a tumultuous assembly; the original Chicago Eight defendants were charged under the then-recent federal Anti-Riot Act for their conduct at the 1968 Democratic National
Convention in Chicago.84 Like the Penn and Mead trial, there were possibilities of jury nullification, although the Chicago Conspiracy Trial jurors did return some guilty verdicts and were not imprisoned.85 Both
trials featured confrontations between judicial power and individual
rights, including findings of criminal contempt based on the defendants’
attire.86
The trial transcript of the robe incident does not capture the appearance of the robes or the defendants’ actions, but does depict the character of the proceedings, including the relationship between the judge and
defense counsel, William Kunstler:
THE COURT: May the record show defendants Hoffman and Rubin
came in at 1:28, with theirMR. RUBIN: The marshal just came and asked us to come in. We
came as soon as we were asked.
THE COURT: And also attired in what might be called collegiate
robes.
MR. RUBIN: Judge’s robes, sir.
A DEFENDANT: Death robes.
THE COURT: Some might even consider them judicial robes.
MR. RUBIN: Judicial robes.
THE COURT: Your idea, Mr. Kunstler? Another one of your brilliant
83 The best description of the robe incident occurs in the contempt case on remand, In re.
Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff’d 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied,
420 U.S. 990 (1975). See Pnina Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial Discretion, 71 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 1327, 1336 (2000) [hereinafter Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial];
Pnina Lahav, Theater in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, 16 LAW & LITERATURE 381,
430–35 (2004).
84 See Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, supra note 101, at 1329–30; Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2101 (2019).
85 See Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. at 1323–25.
86 Id. at 1347–48.
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ideas?
MR. KUNSTLER: Your Honor, I can’t take credit for this one.
THE COURT: That amazes me.87
Federal judge Julius Hoffman issued criminal contempt citations for a
multitude of infractions by the defendants, as well as their attorneys.88
The wearing of the judicial robes by defendants Abbie Hoffman and
Jerry Rubin were only two of the specifications of contempt among more
than 150 for the seven defendants and their two attorneys in the fivemonth trial the judge described as “marred by continual disruptive outbursts in direct defiance of judicial authority by defendants and defense
counsel.”89
After the Seventh Circuit remanded the cases to be tried before a
judge other than the judge who had issued the criminal contempt citations, Judge Edward Gignoux of Maine, sitting by special designation,
found that some of the contempt citations lacked merit, but did find
Hoffman and Rubin guilty of contempt based upon the robe incident.90
In his opinion, after describing the episode, he noted that the defendants
had testified their “conduct was ‘guerrilla theater’ and ‘symbolic communication’ of their contempt for the judge and the judicial process, as
well as their view that judicial robes were simply a cloak for police brutality.”91 This inchoate free expression claim remained implicit. Although Judge Gignoux conceded that “the record does not disclose that
the conduct charged to these defendants in these specifications caused
any substantial disruption of the proceedings,” he found the defendants’
actions “so flagrant, so outrageous, and so subversive of both respect for
the court and the integrity of the judicial process as to rise to the level
of an actual and material obstruction of the administration of justice.”92
Essentially, the judge concluded that the actions of Hoffman and Rubin
achieved exactly what they intended: a subversion of the hierarchal order demanded by the judicial process.
Important to this hierarchal order is the notion of professionalization,
including not only the attire of attorneys but also that attorneys represent, and generally speak for, the litigants. Bobby Seale, the eighth
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. (appendix quoting transcript).
Id.
In re Dellinger, 461 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1972) .
Id. at 402–465.
Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. at 1315.
Id. The judge directed that no sentence be imposed. Id. at 1321–22.
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member of the Chicago Eight, sought to subvert this hierarchy by representing himself when his attorney of choice was hospitalized and Judge
Hoffman refused to postpone the trial.93 Seale vigorously asserted his
right, including his right to represent himself, on numerous occasions,
including statements addressing the judge thus:
After you done walked over people’s constitutional rights, after
you done walked over people’s constitutional rights, the Sixth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the phoniness and the
corruptness of this very trial, for people to have a right to speak
out, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and et cetera. You
have did everything you could with those jive lying witnesses up
there presented by these pig agents of the Government to lie and
say and condone some rotten racists, fascist crap by racist cops
and pigs that beat people’s heads—and I demand my constitutional rights—demand—demand . . . .94
For these and other statements, Judge Hoffman adjudged Bobby Seale in
contempt of court and declared a mistrial solely for him, thus transforming the Chicago Eight Trial into the Chicago Seven Trial.95 But first, Judge
Hoffman ordered Bobby Seale shackled, bound to a chair, and gagged, a
display that continued for several days.96 The image of Bobby Seale—
the only African American defendant—arrayed in muslin face coverings,
chained, and tied was one many found shocking. The defendant was
dressed in a disruptive manner, albeit not by his own choosing.
In reviewing Seale’s appeal from the contempt citations, the Seventh
Circuit cursorily approved the restraining attire, citing Illinois v. Allen,
decided by the United States Supreme Court several months after Bobby
Seale had been shackled, gagged, and tied at trial.97 Illinois v. Allen involved the expulsion of a mentally ill defendant during his trial, but the
Bobby Seale spectacle was obviously on the minds of the Justices.98 Justice Black, who in his dissent in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District the year before had complained of young people
93
94
95
96

United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 379 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id.
Id. at 388–89.
As the Seventh Circuit explained, Seale was restrained, bound, and gagged on the afternoon
of October 29, 1969; his restraints were removed on November 3. “On November 5, after six weeks
of trial, the court sua sponte declared a mistrial as to Seale, and his trial was severed from that of
his co-defendants.” Seale, 461 F.2d at 350.
97 Id. citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
98 See Allen, 397 U.S. at 351–52.
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and a “new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered
by the judiciary,”99 wrote for the Court that although it “is not pleasant
to hold” that a defendant could be banished from the court for parts of
his own trial, disruptive defendants must not be allowed to treat the
courts, “palladiums of liberty as they are,” with disrespect.100 The opinion offered “three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to
handle an obstreperous defendant”: bind and gag him, cite him for contempt, or remove him from the courtroom.101 Yet the Court made clear
that the first of these was the least acceptable.102 Shackling and gagging
was a “last resort” that could significantly affect a jury and constituted
“something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of the judicial
proceedings.”103
Writing separately, Justice Douglas made explicit the connection to
“political trials” and extensively quoted from the Penn and Mead
Trial.104 Although not mentioning William Mead, or Penn’s hat, Justice
Douglas focused on Penn as a member of an “unpopular minority” who
was asserting his rights to the consternation of the “sincere, law-andorder” panel of judges who wished something to be done to Penn “to
stop his mouth.”105 For Douglas, political trials, presumably including
the Chicago Conspiracy Trial, implicated the heart of constitutional democracy in which both majorities and minorities have an important
stake.106
It is not only in overtly political trials that the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants become enmeshed in matters of habiliment. The
quintet of cases from the United States Supreme Court—Illinois v. Allen
(1973), Estelle v. Williams (1976), Holbrook v. Flynn (1986), Deck v. Missouri (2005), and Carey v. Musladin (2006)—considered matters of attire in the context of criminal trials and did not involve the manifest
challenges to democracy and hierarchy obvious in the Chicago
99 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting).
100 Allen, 397 U.S. at 346.
101 Id. at 342.
102 Id. at 345.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 353.
106 Justice Douglas did not use the word “democracy,” but wrote of the “social compact”: “Problems of political indictments and of political judges raise profound questions going to the heart of
the social compact. For that compact is two-sided: majorities undertake to press their grievances
within limits of the Constitution and in accord with its procedures; minorities agree to abide by
constitutional procedures in resisting those claims.” Id. at 356.
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Conspiracy Trial or the Penn and Mead Trial.107 Nevertheless, the
Court’s discussions of the relevance of clothes and appearance implicate
issues of democracy, hierarchy, and constitutionalism.
Of central concern is whether the attire at issue brands the defendant
with the mark of guilt. The Bill of Rights devotes the majority of its provisions to rights in the criminal context, although the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial are not specifically enumerated. Instead, the right to a fair trial inheres in the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, although it could be said to flow
from the Sixth Amendment as a whole or the provisions relating to a
“public trial” or an “impartial jury.”108 Additionally, the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel can be pertinent, not only because
the defendant wishes to represent himself as in Allen, but because the
defendant’s attire might inhibit his ability to consult with counsel. As
the Court in Allen noted, one reason to disfavor restraining a defendant
is that the ability to communicate with counsel is “greatly reduced when
the defendant is in a condition of total physical restraint.”109
More important, however, the rights to a fair trial and to an impartial
jury are compromised when a defendant wears shackles. Extending Allen, a divided Court in Deck v. Missouri found this was true even during
the sentencing phase, when a jury was deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty on a defendant wearing leg irons, handcuffs, and
a belly chain.110 Although this convicted defendant no longer possessed
the presumption of innocence, the right to effective counsel could be implicated given that shackles could “confuse and embarrass” a defendant.111 Moreover, the wearing of shackles constituted an affront to the
dignity of the courtroom that included “the respectful treatment of defendants.”112 While a trial judge could certainly take account of individualized security concerns, including the dangerousness of the
107 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Holbrook
v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70
(2006).
108 The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
109 Allen, 397 U.S. at 344.
110 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
111 Id. at 631.
112 Id.
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defendant, the Court advised that the “symbolic yet concrete objectives”
of courtroom decorum should generally not be disrupted by a defendant
wearing shackles.113
Considerations of dangerousness also informed the Court’s unanimous decision in Holbrook v. Flynn to uphold the appearance of several
uniformed state troopers sitting behind the six defendants.114 While this
deviated from the general practice of extra security details wearing civilian clothes, a combination of factors made this impracticable.115 The
Court rejected the analogy to wearing shackles, noting that the uniformed guards did not necessarily communicate the defendants’ dangerousness and could just as easily be interpreted by jurors as guarding
against more general disruptions.116 The Court noted that while it might
be the better practice to have officers doff their uniforms when providing security, the Court’s role in reviewing a constitutional challenge to a
state-court practice was more limited.117
The limited role of the judicial review, especially given federalism
concerns, governed the outcome in the two other cases of the quintet. In
Estelle v. Williams, the Court unequivocally held that compelling a defendant to wear “prison garb” during the state court trial was a violation
of the right to a fair trial inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.118 Unlike wearing shackles, there was no state interest
possibly served by wearing “jail attire.”119 Further, there were equality
concerns because the practice affected those who were unable to afford
posting bail prior to trial.120 However, the Court’s majority did not extend relief to Harry Lee Williams, because although he had requested an
officer at the jail to return his civilian clothes for court, his attorney did
not object to Williams’s prison attire.121 While a state cannot compel a
defendant to appear at trial in jail clothes, there must be an objection to
preserve this right. The objection requirement not only serves federalism concerns but also preserves the possibility of a defense trial strategy
of dressing the defendant in jail attire as a sympathy ploy.122
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 568–69.
Id. at 572.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976).
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. at 509-513.
Id.
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Williams’s emphasis on state compulsion foreshadows the problem of
government control over a public trial. In Carey v. Musladin, the Court
considered a constitutional challenge by a convicted defendant who argued that spectators wearing buttons with photos of the victim denied
him a fair trial.123 The Court’s opinion was decisively procedural. Because the United States Supreme Court had never ruled on the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators, Musladin’s claim was foreclosed by
a federal statute limiting habeas corpus relief to constitutional violations that were contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.124 While the opinion was unanimous, Justice Souter’s concurring
opinion contended that trial judges had affirmative obligations to ensure a fair trial, including regulating the attire of spectators.125
One example of a trial judge taking such an obligation seriously occurred in a homicide trial in New York in which the judge banned the
wearing of “obtrusive corsages of red and black ribbons of approximately five to six inches in length.”126 Applying the local courtroom decorum rules prohibiting disruptive conduct, the trial judge used his discretionary power to prohibit all expressive or symbolic clothing and
accessories, including armbands, buttons, and flowers, as “disruptive of
a courtroom environment, which environment must be scrupulously
dedicated to the appearance as well as the reality of fairness and
equal.”127 The judge criticized his own past practice in a non-jury trial
permitting thirty-five spectators wearing bright yellow T-shirts bearing

123 Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
124 Id. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2254, passed in 1996,

provides, “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
125 Musladin, 549 U.S. at 81-83 (Souter, J., concurring).
126 People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1990). Other cases include Norris v. Risley, 918
F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990) (anti-rape buttons); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1985) (MAAD
buttons); Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454 (11th Cir. 1991) (spectators wearing prison guard uniforms in prosecution for murder of prison guard). Scholarship on this issue includes Sierra Elizabeth, The Newest Spectator Sport: Why Extending Victims’ Rights to the Spectators’ Gallery Erodes
the Presumption of Innocence, 58 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 275–309 (2008); Jona Goldsschmidt, “Order in
the Court!”: Constitutional Issues in the Law of Courtroom Decorum, 31 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW 1
(2008); Scott Kitner, The Need and Means to Restrict Spectators from Wearing Buttons at Criminal
Trials, 27 REVIEW OF LITIGATION 773 (2008); Meghan E. Lind, Hearts on Their Sleeves: Symbolic Displays of Emotion by Spectators in Criminal Trials, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1147 (2008); Elizabeth
Lyon, A Picture Is Worth A Thousand Words: The Effect of Spectators’ Display of Victim Photographs
During A Criminal Jury Trial on A Criminal Defendant’s Fair Trial Rights, 36 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 517
(2009).
127 Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
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the blue legend “Justice for Jimmy,” the victim.128 While the vast majority of spectator attire that has been litigated seems to favor the victim
and thus possibly prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the judge
also referenced the high profile “Central Park Jogger” criminal prosecution, in which the trial judge “barred a spectator-brother of one of defendants from wearing a black sweatshirt with the letters emblemized
in white, ‘My Brother Antron McCray Is Innocent.’”129 Of course, she was
correct.130
Any First Amendment rights of the spectators, even ones that would
not prejudice a defendant, are blurred. Concurring in Musladin, Souter
raised the possibility of the spectators’ First Amendment right to wear
buttons, although he stated he did not find such an interest “intuitively
strong.”131 In the New York corsages case, the trial judge was dismissive:
although free expression was at the “very core of our organized democratic society,” it had no place in the courtroom, a “holy shrine of impartiality” that was clearly committed to special and defined purposes and
not the “airing of general grievances.”132
What if the button-wearer is not a spectator, but a state employee
who would presumably possess First Amendment rights? Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, the state employee might have limited rights during the
performance of the work as opposed to off-duty,133 yet if the government allows the attire, the criminal defendant may not have a claim for
unfairness. In Sparks v. Davis, Justice Sotomayor issued a statement “respecting the denial of certiorari” in an application for a stay of execution
by Robert Sparks:
The allegations presented in this petition are disturbing.
On the day the jury began punishment deliberations in petitioner Robert Sparks’ capital murder trial, one of the bailiffs on
duty in the courtroom wore a black tie embroidered with a white
syringe—a tie that he admitted he wore to express his support
for the death penalty.
That an officer of the court conducted himself in such a manner
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See Sofia Yarken, Brett Kavanaugh vs. The Exonerated Central Park Five: Exposing the Pres-

ident’s “Presumption of Innocence” Double Standard, 33 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 101 (2019).
131 Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 83 (2006) (Souter, J., concurring).
132 Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 614–15.
133 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial
discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities).
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is deeply troubling. Undoubtedly, such “distinctive, identifiable
attire may affect a juror’s judgment.” [citing Estelle v. Williams].
The state habeas court, however, conducted an evidentiary
hearing but did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the
jury saw the tie. I therefore do not disagree with the denial of
certiorari. I nevertheless hope that presiding judges aware of
this kind of behavior would see fit to intervene in future cases
by completely removing the offending item or court officer from
the jury’s presence. Only this will ensure the “very dignity and
decorum of judicial proceedings” they are entrusted to uphold.
[citing Illinois v. Allen]. The stakes—life in this case, liberty in
many others—are too high to allow anything less.134
The United States Supreme Court bans expressive dress at the United
States Supreme Court building and its environs.135 While the Court’s
guide for visitors to oral argument prohibits “display buttons and inappropriate clothing,” federal statutes prohibit the display of any flag, banner, or “device” designed or adapted to “bring into public notice a party,
organization, or movement” in the Supreme Court building or
grounds.136 In 1983 in United States v. Grace, the Court held that the prohibition could not constitutionally extend to the sidewalk, a traditional
public forum.137 Justice Thurgood Marshall contended that the entire
statute should be unconstitutional, noting that it “would be ironic indeed if an exception to the Constitution were to be recognized for the
very institution that has the chief responsibility for protecting constitutional rights.”138
Yet Marshall’s irony is the current state of the law. Interpretations of
“devices that bring into public notice a party, organization, or movement” make clear that they extend to clothes. For example, a D.C. appellate court held that “costumes—the orange jumpsuit and the black
hood—constituted ‘devices,”‘ and another D.C. appellate likewise found
the wearing of orange jumpsuits, with or without black hoods, and the
wearing of orange T-shirts with the phrase “Shut Down Guantanamo” to
be covered by the prohibition.139 Such rulings have revealed two other
134 Sparks v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 6, 6 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), cert. denied.
135 See SUP. CT. U.S., Visitors Guide to Oral Argument, available at https://www.su-

premecourt.gov/visiting/visitorsguidetooralargument.aspx.
136 Id.; 40 U.S.C. §13k; 40 U.S.C. §6135.
137 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
138 Id. at 185 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
139 See Potts v. United States, 919 A.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C.2007); Kinane v. United States, 12 A.3d
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ironies. First, the prohibitions invert the usual hierarchy of protected
speech classifications so that the most highly valued category of political
speech becomes the least protected. Second, the prohibitions banish the
central issue of disruption. Courts have reasoned that the statutory prohibition on “devices” was not directed at preventing disruption, but rather on preserving the “appearance of the Court as a body not swayed
by external influence.”140 Thus, it does not matter that that the clothes
themselves caused no actual disruption because they apparently disrupt
the notion that the Court is not subject to democratic influences.
IV. EDUCATIONAL DRESS UNROBED
The “disruption” standard for students articulated by the Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District141 is often
applied to teachers. While teachers no longer wear robes except for special occasions such as graduation ceremonies, the necktie might be considered a modern vestige of the robe, or at least the ruff that often encircled the neck of a robe. In considering whether or not a dress code
that mandates a tie can constitutionally be applied to public school
teachers, courts have often acknowledged the government’s interests in
promoting respect, professionalism, a semblance of uniformity, and
even dignity. Courts have differed, however, regarding the constitutionality of the means of achieving these interests. Such differences appear
whether the challenge is based upon free expression or liberty or other
constitutional arguments. They implicate not only individual constitutional rights but also local control of school boards and the judicial role.
Ruling on a teacher’s challenge to a dismissal based upon attire and facial hair, the future Justice Stevens, then a Seventh Circuit judge, wrote,
“just as the individual has an interest in a choice among different styles
of appearance and behavior, and a democratic society has an interest in
fostering diverse choices, so also does society have a legitimate interest
in placing limits on the exercise of that choice,” and the federal courts
should be hesitant to substitute their own judgment for that of the
school board “on a question of manners.”142
23 (D.C. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 574 (U.S. 2011).
140 Id. at 1129 (internal citation omitted).
141 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding that “[i]n
order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression
of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
142 Miller v. School Dist., 495 F.2d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 1974).
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Extensive litigation beginning in the mid-1970s that challenged the
mandatory (for male teachers) necktie policy of the Board of Education
of East Hartford, Connecticut is illustrative.143 The teacher objected to
the necktie policy not only on the basis of his personal autonomy, but he
also argued that the absence of a necktie actually enhanced his ability to
teach by allowing him a “closer rapport” with his students.144 The district judge dismissed the constitutional challenge to the policy, noting
that a teacher’s positive example in dress and grooming “enlarges the
importance of the task of teaching, presents an image of dignity and encourages respect for authority.”145 The district judge proclaimed that
such school policies are necessary to forestall the possibility of teachers
“wearing ‘Bermuda shorts’ or similarly inappropriate forms of flamboyant dress.”146 A panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district judge,
finding that the school board’s asserted interests of establishing a professional image for teachers and maintaining respect within the classroom were not served by the tie requirement.147 The panel opinion
waxed on the expressive nature of attire—the robe of “priest and judge
alike” has been a mark of authority—and favored the (American) liberty
interest in dress over the unfortunate (Chinese and Russian) history of
“oppression accomplished by body-tegument conformity.”148 In another reversal, the en banc Second Circuit credited the board’s interest
in “promoting respect for authority and traditional values, as well as discipline in the classroom, by requiring teachers to dress in a professional
manner,” and further applauded the school board’s good faith in distinguishing between a “traditional English class” during which the teacher
was required to wear a tie, and the “alternative” class in filmmaking,
when he was not.149 During an era when school busing cases dominated
other circuits, the Second Circuit en banc stated that “it is not the federal
courts, but local democratic processes, that are primarily responsible
for the many routine decisions that are made in public school

143 E. Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 405 F. Supp. 94 (D. Conn. 1975) rev’d, 562 F.2d 838
(2d Cir. 1977), rev’d 562 F.2d 832,856 (rehearing en banc 1977). Similarly in Blanchet v. Vennilion
Parish Sch. Bd., 220 So. 2d 534 (La. Ct. App. 1969), writ denied, 222 So. 2d 68 (1969) (rejecting the
teacher’s challenge to a mandatory necktie policy).
144 E. Hartford Educ. Ass’n,. 405 F. Supp at 95.
145 Id. at 98.
146 Id.
147 E. Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d. Cir. 1977).
148 Id. at 841-842.
149 E. Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 859, n.7 (2d. Cir. rehearing en banc
1977).
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systems.”150 Judicial restraint was especially appropriate because the
teacher’s “interest in his neckwear” did not “weigh very heavily on the
constitutional scales”; he could “remove his tie as soon as the school day
ends.”151
Compared to mandatory tie requirements, regulations of teachers’
hairstyles have the potential to be more burdensome: the moment it
takes to remove a necktie after work is obviously not sufficient to regrow a beard. Additionally, courts have discussed the relationship between beards (and other hair) and race, although just as in the Title VII
cases involving black women’s hair, the constitutional cases involving
black male teachers and hair display a marked doctrinal incoherency.
For example, one court rejected any possibility that “the wearing of a
mustache had been so appropriated as cultural symbol by members of
the Negro race as to make its suppression either an automatic badge of
racial prejudice or a necessary abridgement of First Amendment
rights.”152 On the other hand, a different court found that the teacher’s
goatee was “worn as ‘an appropriate expression of his heritage, culture
and racial pride as a black man.’”153
Yet the most important distinction in the cases regarding teachers’ attire and hair is the level of the school at issue. Considering its hair regulation jurisprudence in 1982, the Fifth Circuit stated that there is a
“bright line” between public colleges and public secondary or elementary schools.154 The asserted needs for professionalism, respect, and
discipline are simply not sufficient at the college level.155 Interestingly,
however, the court rejected an argument that the line should be between adults and adolescents: requiring all school employees, even bus
drivers, to adhere to the dress code for students served the interests of
the school in discipline and authority, as well as uniformity.156 While
many of the challenges to schools occurred during the “counter culture”
era, provoking judicial hostility or sympathy, it is nevertheless remarkable that judges cite cases involving students and teachers interchangeably. While the rhetoric is that of respect, hierarchy, and professionalism, it is as if the teachers’ status as adult employees and the students’
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 861-62
Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477, 480–81 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
Braxton v. Bd of Pub. Instruction. 303 F. Supp. 958, 959 (M.D. Fla.1969).
Domico v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 675 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 101.
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status as minors legally compelled to attend school are commensurate.
For students, their entry into adulthood might be said to be at high
school graduation, a ceremony during which they traditionally wear
robe-like attire. As one federal judge described it, the cap and gown is
the “universal symbol of achievement and honor in the academic
world.”157 The judge used this universality to defeat the First Amendment claim of a high school senior who wanted to wear his traditional
Lakota clothing at graduation in Bear v. Fleming, decided in 2010.158 The
judge found that the student’s expressive activity must yield to the
school board’s interests, including an interest in “demonstrating the
unity of the class and celebrating academic achievement.”159 The judge
noted that “not all of the audience members will be Lakota or will understand the significance of Mr. Dreaming Bear’s traditional Lakota
clothing,” repeating that in contrast, the cap and gown “is a universally
recognized symbol.”160 But as the court’s opinion also noted, the graduating class consisted of ten seniors, nine of whom were Lakota.161 Tellingly, the judge reasoned that the “graduation proceedings celebrate not
only the students’ achievements, but also the school’s achievement as an
institution of learning and the teachers’ and administrators’ achievements as educators.”162
Thus, the judge presiding over the hearing on Dreaming Bear’s request for preliminary relief, presumably attired in his own black judicial
robe over his clothes, ruled to mandate Dreaming Bear conform to a
“tradition” that elided Dreaming Bear’s own tradition, culture, and individuality.
CONCLUSION
Even if we were able to start anew with a mandate that we all wear
robes—lawyers, law professors, teachers, and perhaps even defendants,
clients and spectators in courtrooms—such a prescription would undermine our rights of expression even as it attempted to establish a superficial equality. Our concerns for our professional dress are never simply
157
158
159
160
161
162

741 F. Supp. 2d 972 (W. Div. S.D. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id. at 991.
Id. at 988. See also Graduation Dress Dispute in South Dakota Ends, THE NEWS COURIER (May
19, 2010), https://www.enewscourier.com/news/state_and_nation/graduation-dress-dispute-insouth-dakota-ends/article_2d6bace5-b935-5494-ab41-a2832feb1f26.html.
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personal ones. We cannot return to the era of the robe, but we should
be able to move forward with more understanding of balancing our
roles and our humanity.

